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CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 111 was amended2 in August 1983' "to
1. The following text shows the additions and deletions affected by the 1983 amendment
(italicized portions show additions, brackets show deletions):
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by any attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or
other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that
the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two wit-
nesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signa-
ture of an attorney orparty constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief [there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay] formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or
movant. [or is signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as
sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served.
For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion,
or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.01[3] (2d ed. 1948). The 1983
amendments were effective August 1, 1983. 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
2. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095, 1099 (1983). Rules
7, 11, 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1983 as part of what
Professor Arthur Miller, the reporter to the Advisory Committee, has called "an integrated pack-
age." A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS To THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 2
(Federal Judicial Center 1984). Rule 7 was amended to make explicit that the certification require-
ment and sanction provisions of Rule 11 are applicable to motions and other papers. FED. R.
CIV. P. 7(b)(3). Rules 16 and 26 were amended, in part, to include the following sanction
provisions:
If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no appear-
ance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party or
party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or
party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or his own initia-
tive, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the
orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other sanc-
tion, the judge shall require the party or the attorney representing him or both to pay the
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dam the flood of litigation that [was] threatening to inundate the courts. ' '4
Amended Rule 11, as part of a broad reform effort,5 is intended to combat
the climbing cost of litigation6 and to deter misuse or abuse of the judicial
system by the mandatory imposition of sanctions on attorneys who violate
the Rule.7 Although the new Rule took effect with the stated goal to "re-
duce frivolous claims, defenses or motions by leading litigants to stop, think
reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attor-
ney's fees, unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the
request, response, or objection and state his address. The signature of the attorney or party
constitutes a certification that he has read the request, response or objection, and that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is:
(1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of
the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be
obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on
whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
3. By order of April 28, 1983, the United States Supreme Court adopted amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Rule 11. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095 (1983). This order states in part, "IThe foregoing... amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on August 1, 1983 and shall govern all civil
proceedings thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, in proceedings then pend-
ing." Id. at 1097; see also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986)
(FED. R. Civ. P. 16, as amended, authorizes sanctions for delay caused by inadequate preparation
for scheduling and pretrial conferences.). For a thorough description of the existing procedures
by which rules and rule amendments are now drafted, reviewed and promulgated, see W. BROWN,
FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILTEs 5-8 (1981).
4. Carter, The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 4, 4 (1985).
5. See generally Address by Arthur R. Miller, Annual Judicial Conference of the Second
Judicial Circuit of the United States (Sept. 30, 1983), reprinted in 101 F.RD. 161, 198 (1984)
(commenting on the litigation crunch problem).
6. See generally Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 217
(1985) (providing statistical analysis of the cost and volume of litigation).
7. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181, 183 (1985).
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers,"'8 the "satel-
lite litigation"9 which the Rule has spawned is "fast becoming the cottage
industry of the 1980's."' 1
After more than 1000 cases and four years,11 the debate persists over the
interpretation and application of amended Rule 11. Some critics suggest
that the new Rule has the capacity to chill vigorous, non-frivolous advocacy
of attorneys in representing their clients."2 Others maintain that the threat
of sanctions is not tantamount to the dampening of a lawyer's creativity.13
These two competing approaches have surfaced as a result of inconsistent
decisions by federal courts which have considered Rule 11. While some
courts are lenient in their imposition of sanctions, others, such as the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals, are notoriously aggressive in enforcing this
new legal mandate.
This Comment traces briefly the history of Rule 11 and the policy con-
cerns that led to its amendment in 1983. A presentation and analysis of the
substantive elements of amended Rule 11 follows. Next, this Comment cri-
tiques several recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and
discusses its arbitrary application of Rule 11. Finally, this Comment con-
cludes by recognizing that continued utilization of capricious sanctions will
have an adverse impact on litigation in the Seventh Circuit.
II. RULE 11 PRIOR TO 1983
A. Origin of Attorneys' Fees
Abuse of the litigation process was first addressed in 181314 when Con-
gress enacted a statute which concerned recovery for attorneys' costs. The
8. Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, app. C
(March 9, 1982) (comments of Chairman Mansfield), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 190, 192 (1983).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 advisory committee notes.
10. Marcotte, Rule 11 Changes- Blessing or Curse?, 72 A.B.A. J. 34 (Sept. 1, 1986) (quoting
Arthur Miller).
11. See Bates, The Rule 11 Debate, 4 Years Later, Nat'1 L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
12. See, e.g., Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986);
Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 184; Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11 LrIGATION 16, 55 (Winter
1985); Weiss, A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use ofAmended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM
L. REV. 23 (1985); Comment, Ask Questions First and Shoot Later Constraining Frivolity in Liti-
gation Under Rule 11, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1267 (1986); Note, The 1983 Amendments to Rule
11: Answering the Critics' Concern With Judicial Self-Restraint, 61 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 798
(1986) (hereinafter Answering the Critics); Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Toward Judicial Restraint, 26
WASHBURN L.J. 337 (1987).
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
14. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 182; see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 759 (1980) (quoting Act of July 22, 1813, 3 Stat. 21). Under the traditional "American
Rule," each side in litigation bears its own attorneys' fees and expenses. The "American Rule"
1988]
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statute specifically provided that any attorney who "multiplied the proceed-
ing in any cause.., so as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously"
could be liable for "any excess of costs so incurred."' 5 This provision, codi-
fied as 28 U.S.C. § 1927,16 was amended by Congress to permit recovery of
expenses and attorneys' fees in addition to costs. i" Presently, the imposition
of sanctions under this statute is limited to attorneys whose conduct is both
"unreasonable and vexatious."' 8
In 1842, another bastion against misuse of the judicial system was af-
forded by Equity Rule 24. Equity Rule 24 dealt with the elimination of
scandalous or impertinent matters in pleadings. Prior to the enactment of
Rule 24, an attorney needed only to attest to the form, not the substance of
a bill or pleading.' 9 Rule 24 expanded this mandate to require the attor-
ney's signature on every bill or pleading as "an affirmation" that there was
"good ground" to support it.2 0 This more comprehensive view of the func-
tion of the attorney's signature was noted by the Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure in the committee's effort to formulate Rule 11.21
Thus, Equity Rule 24 was the basis for Rule 11, which was first adopted as
part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.22
differs from practice in England where, since 1278, courts have been authorized to award counsel
fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717
(1967).
15. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 759. This provision is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) now provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States
or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Id.
17. Id. Section 1927 does not authorize the imposition of damages and costs upon parties.
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986); Maneikis v. Jordan, 678 F.2d
720, 723 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
18. Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 182. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1403 (5th ed. 1979), defines
vexatious as "without reasonable or probable cause or excuse" (emphasis added).
Even under the present section 1927, the "blissfully ignorant" attorney who files a frivolous
claim, even if objectively unreasonable and vexatious, has been spared section 1927 sanctions. See
Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831.
19. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 9-13 (1976).
20. Id. at 52-61. The "good ground to support" rule seems to derive from Supreme Court
Justice Story's discussion of the signature requirement in his treatise on equity practice. J. STORY,
EQUITY PLEADINGS 48 (10th ed. 1892).
21. 1 F.R.D. lxxxii (1938).
22. Risinger, supra note 19, at 13.
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B. Original Rule: 1938 to 1983
Rule 11, as first expressed,23 stated in part that the signature of an attor-
ney "constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." 24 This signature certifica-
tion eliminated the prior practice of using affidavits by a party to verify
pleadings.2" Under the original Rule, there were two distinct sanctioning
provisions: the "sham and false" provision and the "willful" violation
section.26
1. The "Sham and False" Provision
Under the first provision of original Rule 11, unsigned pleadings, or
pleadings signed with an intent to defeat the purpose of the Rule,27 could be
stricken "as sham and false." The action would then continue "as though
the pleading had not been served."' 28 This, however, was an unduly harsh
23. The United States Supreme Court promulgated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415,
§ 1, 48 Stat. 1064. Rule II remained unchanged until amended in 1983.
24. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules originally provided:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attor-
ney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accom-
panied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may
be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (amended 1983). For cases in which courts applied the original Rule, see
Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (attorney assumed that good grounds
supported allegations satisfying good faith standard); United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443, 445
(D. Neb. 1950) (attorney's signature as evidence of good faith).
25. Answering the Critics, supra note 12, at 798. For an analysis of Rule 11 as originally
adopted, see Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11 - Is the Stop, Look, and Investigate Re-
quirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. Rnv. 751, 753-58 (1985).
26. Carter, supra note 4, at 7. Although the original Rule focused on an attorney's conduct,
the enforcement provisions were aimed at the client. Nelken, supra note 12, at 1315.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (amended 1983). For the text of the original Rule, see supra note 24.
The original Rule was designed to regulate honesty in pleading practice. See Risinger, supra note
19, at 4 (goal of Rule 11 is honesty in pleadings). Although the language of the Rule was directed
primarily at lawyer honesty, the provision for striking as sham historically required both a deter-
mination of the dishonesty of the pleader and of the falsity of the pleading. Id. at 16.
28. See supra note 24.
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sanction which penalized the client as well as the attorney for the attorney's
misconduct. As the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 amendments
state, this sanction was rarely utilized.29 Because federal judges were reluc-
tant to levy this radical sanction, a very high threshold for its imposition
was established.3 °
As a result of this very high threshold, the first "genuine adversary Rule
11" motion 31 to strike a pleading as "sham" did not occur until 1950 in
United States v. Long.32 In Long, a district court rejected the motion to
strike the defendant's general denial of the plaintiff's complaint. 33 Although
29. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee notes. Professors Wright and Miller state:
A motion to dismiss as sham under Rule 11 should not be granted if there is any possibility
that the party can prove his case. Appropriately, the courts have been reluctant to charac-
terize a pleading as sham unless it contradicts matters of public record. As was noted by
the Supreme Court in the early case of Bates v. Clark, '[a motion to strike a plea as sham
and frivolous] is an unscientific and unprofessional mode of raising and deciding a pure
issue of law.... A motion to strike out a plea is properly made when it has been filed
irregularly, is not sworn to, if that is required, or wants signature of counsel, or any defect
of that character; but if a real and important issue of law is to be made, that issue should be
raised by demurrer.' Rule 11 should not be used to raise issues of legal sufficiency that
more properly can be disposed of by a motion for a more definite statement or by a motion
for summary judgment. The signature rule, which is designed to encourage honesty in the
bar when bringing and defending actions, ought to be employed only in those rare cases in
which an attorney deliberately presses an unfounded claim or defense.
5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1334, at 502-03 (1969)
(quoting Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1877)). Risinger, supra note 19, at 34-35, stated that
only twenty-three cases involved an attempt to strike a pleading as "sham" under Rule 11 from
1938 to 1976. It was also reported that failure to sign was never used as the basis to strike a
pleading. Id. at 15. But cf United States ex rel. Sacks v. Philadelphia Health Management Corp.,
519 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (pleading was struck for failure to sign). However, courts
usually denied motions to strike pleadings, relying on the presumption that counsel had filed the
pleading in good faith. See, e.g., Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956);
Murchison, 27 F.R.D. at 19; Long, 10 F.R.D. at 445.
For a comprehensive survey of pre-1983 practice under Rule 11, see Note, Civil Procedure -
The Demise of a Subjective Bad Faith Standard Under Amended Rule 11, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 107, 115-
21 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Incomco v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 558 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1977)
(plaintiff had no capacity to sue); Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214, 215 (9th Cir. 1972) (plead-
ing could be stricken only if it contradicted matters of public record); Child v. Beame, 412 F.
Supp. 593, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing Murchison, 27 F.R.D. at 19 (pleading could be shown to
be sham and false beyond peradventure)).
31. Risinger, supra note 19, at 35. In his 1976 article, Risinger found only nineteen Rule 11
motions. Id. Wright, Miller, and Kane cite approximately forty cases decided between 1975 and
1983 that deal with Rule 11 issues other than failure to sign pleadings. 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 29, § 1332-34 (1983 Supp.).
32. 10 F.R.D. 443 (D. Neb. 1950).
33. Id. at 445. In the complaint, the plaintiff supported allegations of the defendant's loan
default with evidence of five promissory notes and records of partial repayment of those notes. Id.
The court doubted that a general denial could be submitted unless the defendant's attorney in-
tended to deny that any relationship existed between the parties. Id.
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
the court recognized that a defendant had no right to deny any allegation
for the sole purpose of charging the plaintiff with the expense of proof, the
court relied on the attorney's signature as evidence of good faith.34 An-
other court held that a Rule 11 motion should be granted to strike a plead-
ing only when it was apparent beyond question that the pleading was "sham
and false."3
2. The "Willful" Violation Section
The second provision regarding sanctions in original Rule 11 was the
"willful" violation provision. Under this provision an attorney could "be
subjected to appropriate disciplinary action"36 for a willful violation of the
Rule. Like the "sham and false" provision, this determination to discipline
an attorney was discretionary with the court. Since former Rule 11 did not
articulate which types of disciplinary action might be taken by the court 37
and since the predominant interpretation penalized only that conduct of a
lawyer undertaken in subjective bad faith, sanctions were infrequently im-
posed.38 Judicial reluctance to use the rule to award attorneys' fees also
stemmed from confusion as to whether it was even permissible to make
such an award pursuant to Rule 11 alone.39 Only in rare circumstances did
sanctions occur.4°
34. Id.
35. Murchison, 27 F.R.D. at 14. The case involved a shareholder's derivative action to set
aside, as fraudulent, a settlement of an earlier derivative suit. Id. at 16-17. The defendants alleged
that the plaintiffs' attorney signed the complaint in bad faith. Id. at 18. The court concluded that
granting the Rule 11 motion would be inappropriate because it would deprive the plaintiffs of
their right to trial. Id. at 19.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, at 501.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes, 97 F.R.D. at 200, reprinted in 2A J.
MOORE & J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.02[2], at 11-12 (1985).
38. It would appear that only in rare circumstances did the federal courts rely solely on
former Rule 11 in awarding attorneys' fees. Note, supra note 29, at 120. Between 1950 and 1976
only one such case was reported. Risinger, supra note 19, at 37 n.123. See Kinee v. Abraham
Lincoln Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 983 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (attorneys' fees imposed
under Rule 11 against plaintiffs' attorney who failed to investigate properly factual basis of allega-
tions before filing a complaint against incorrectly named defendants).
39. See, eg., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (court uncertain as to
permissibility of awarding attorneys' fees as sanction under Rule 11); Republic of Cape Verde v. A
& A Partners, 89 F.R.D. 14, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (award of counsel fees under Rule 11 was
virtually unprecedented); Ferrer Delgado v. Sylvia de Jesus, 440 F. Supp. 979, 982 (D.P.R. 1976)
(court only mentioned Rule 11 in awarding defendant her attorneys' fees under a local rule re-
garding false complaints); Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531, 535 (W.D. La. 1968) (court dis-
missed plaintiff's complaint under both Rule 11 and Rule 12(f)).
40. See supra note 38.
1988]
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Occasionally, where a court found that an attorney acted with subjective
bad faith which qualified as a willful violation of Rule 1 l,4  the court im-
posed attorneys' fees "as an exercise of their inherent equitable powers, or
under a specific statutory provision relating to the substantive claims," '4 2 or
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 41 Other courts found authority for imposing attor-
neys' fees based on any combination of the above grounds. In these early
applications of the Rule, a violation was used only to support a court's deci-
sion.' The subjective bad faith standard which was required to impose
sanctions against an attorney enabled courts to arbitrarily select the basis
on which to assess attorneys' fees.4"
3. Original Rule 11: A Failed Remedy
While judicial hesitation to utilize Rule 11 sanctions and the difficulty of
showing subjective bad faith combined to nullify the influence of original
Rule 11 on litigation,46 misuse of the litigation process and congestion of
the federal court dockets continued to grow.47 In 1976, Chief Justice War-
ren Burger reflected on these concerns when he stated: "Correct or not,
there is ... a widespread feeling that the legal profession and judges are
overly tolerant to lawyers who exploit the inherently contentious aspects of
the adversary system to their own private advantage at public expense." '48
41. See North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
where the court found authority for imposing attorneys' fees in section 1927, Rule 11 and the
court's inherent equitable powers. Id. at 297-98. Although the court acknowledged that Rule 11
gave it the power to award fees, the court relied solely on section 1927 in its decision. Id.
42. Note, supra note 29, at 118.
43. For the text of the statute, see supra note 16.
44. See supra notes 38 and 41.
45. See Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern Ill. Univ., 87 F.R.D. 751 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
Although the court found a willful violation of Rule 11, the court imposed sanctions based on
both Rule 11 and its own inherent equitable powers. Id. at 754.
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes. "There has been considerable confusion as
to (1) the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary
action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings and motions, and (3)
the range of available and appropriate sanctions." Id. (citing R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C.
MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 64-65 (1981)).
47. Nelken, supra note 12, at 1316; see also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1984). The number of cases pend-
ing in the district courts rose from 140,189 in 1976, to 231,920 in 1983, an increase of 65.4%. Id.
(table 4).
48. Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. - Need for Systematic
Anticipation, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice (April 7-9, 1976) (conference commemorating Roscoe Pound's address to the
American Bar Association's 1906 annual meeting), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 79, 91 (1976).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed a
similar view in Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co.." The court asserted
that there was an absence of subjective bad faith on the part of an attorney
which prevented sanctions, even though his client contradicted every mate-
rial allegation by testimony at a deposition. It was clear that by the early
1980's, Rule 11, once described as "the most famous and widely applicable
binding precept regulating lawyer honesty in pleading,""1 had failed misera-
bly in deterring abusive and dilatory tactics. 2
III. AMENDED RULE 11: AN ELEMENTAL APPROACH AND ANALYSIS
A. An Overview of the Rule
Rule 11 was amended, effective August 1, 1983.53 Embodied in the
amended Rule is a stringent prohibition against frivolous litigation. In con-
trast with the original Rule, new Rule 11 attempts to put forth objective
criteria to determine "frivolousness,""4 an elusive term, which may be
"more readily recognized than cogently defined."'5 5 The amended rule re-
quires attorneys to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal
basis for every pleading, motion and other paper filed.56 This new objective
test of reasonableness has replaced the former test of subjective bad faith.
Additionally, current Rule 11 impacts on pleadings filed for "any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation. 51 7 A violation of any one of the affirmative
49. 717 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1983).
50. Id. at 1162.
51. Risinger, supra note 19, at 4-5.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983). Judge
Schwarzer has expressly stated that "[w]idespread concern over frivolous litigation and abusive
practices of attorneys" led to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11. Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 181.
53. See supra note 1. To understand the rapidly evolving law of sanctions it is necessary to go
back to the 1980 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980). At that time, three Justices of the
Supreme Court dissented from their promulgation, not because the amendments were inherently
objectionable, but because the dissenters believed that the proposed changes fell short of those
needed to accomplish reforms in civil litigation that would address the twin problems of abuse of
discovery and the cost of litigation. Id. at 997-98 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was
joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist. Id.
54. Rule 11 contains two grounds for sanctions. The first ground is the "frivolousness
clause." Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986).
55. Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 701, 705 (1972) ("Frivolous-
ness, like madness and obscenity, is more readily recognized than cogently defined.").
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Amended Rule 11 applies to pleadings, motions and other papers,
whereas the original Rule 11 only applied to pleadings; see id.
57. Id.
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duties embodied in Rule 11 will result in mandatory sanctions on the attor-
ney, the client or both. 8
Rule 11, as amended, emphasizes the role of an attorney as an officer of
the court. It mandates that an attorney's duty to a client cannot be permit-
ted to override his duty to the justice system. 9 Rule 11 intends "to reduce
the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions"'  by presenting judges with a
more focused standard and an expanded role as active case managers.61
Rule 11 contains two prongs which provide for sanctions. The first
prong is the "frivolousness" clause, otherwise known as the "well-founded"
clause.62 This part of the Rule presents two issues: whether the party or
attorney made a reasonable inquiry into the facts, and whether the party or
attorney made a reasonable inquiry into the law. 63 A violation of either
subpart of the frivolousness clause constitutes an infraction of Rule 11. The
second prong, the "improper purpose" doctrine, requires that a pleading
not be interposed for any improper purpose, and is placed in the conjunc-
tive with the frivolousness clause.' Thus, a violation of the frivolousness
clause or the improper purpose section will result in sanctions.
58. Rule 11 requires federal district judges to sanction those who file or pursue frivolous
lawsuits. A similar rule exists to discourage frivolous appeals. See FED. R. App. P. 38 ("If a
court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single
or double costs to the appellee."). A growing number of states have adopted rules similar to Rule
11. See, eg., Wis. STAT. § 814.025 (1985-86); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 1l(a); Ky. R. Civ. P. 11; MICH.
Cr. R. 2.114.
59. See Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827, dam-
ages awarded, 474 U.S. 992 (1985); In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1985),
vacated, 838 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Salomon, Should There Be Limits on Lawyer Zeal?,
Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1986, at 17, col. 1.
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes (amended Rule 11 "intended to reduce
the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions"); A. MILLER, supra note 2; Miller & Culp, Litigation
Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col. 1.
61. The concept of judges as case managers is generally accepted today. See generally Oli-
phant, Rule 11 Sanctions and Standards: Blunting the Judicial Sword, 12 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 731, 743 (1986) ("Even attorneys who see themselves as vigilant guardians of every aspect of
a client's case, no longer oppose stronger judicial involvement in the pretrial area."). See also
Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to
Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770 (1981); Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376
(1982).
62. See supra note 54; see also Note, Risky Business: The Nuts and Bolts of Amended Rule
11(a), Boone v. Superior Court, 145 Ariz. 235, 700 P.2d 1335 (1985), 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 145, 152
(1987).
63. See Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987).
64. See Ronco, 105 F.R.D. at 495.
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
B. The Frivolousness Clause
1. Reasonable Inquiry Into Fact
The frivolousness clause of Rule 11 demands that an attorney certify,
based on "the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry [that the pleading] is well grounded in fact."65 This qual-
ification refines the former necessity that there be "good ground to support"
a paper filed with the court.66 This new affirmative duty, that the attorney
investigate the facts, was not explicit under the old Rule or the cases inter-
preting it.67 Under this provision the facts need not be undisputed or indis-
putable, but they must be sufficiently substantial to support a reasonable
belief in the existence of a factual basis for the paper.68
The requisite factual inquiry can be obtained through personal inter-
views with the client and key witnesses as well as review of all relevant
documents.69 It is not permissible to fie suit and use discovery as the sole
means of determining whether a client has a valid claim70 when a reason-
able independent investigation of available information could support or
dismiss the factual basis. A mere hunch that a client may have a cause of
action is no longer enough to justify the filing of a complaint. An attorney
must have some reasonably reliable information that a claim exists. 71 Yet
despite the affirmative investigative burden placed on the attorney, Rule 11
is not designed to require perfect knowledge of a potential claim, particu-
larly if the facts are presumptively under the control of the opposing
party.7 2
The reasonableness of an attorney's belief should be tested in light of the
circumstances "at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was sub-
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
66. See supra note 24.
67. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, at 499-500 ("[t]he cases [under the former
rule] do not make it clear to what extent an attorney must investigate his client's case prior to
signing").
68. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 187; see also Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp.
166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983).
69. See Wold, 575 F. Supp. at 167; see also Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memo-
rial Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
70. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987).
71. Rothschild, Rule 11: Stop, Think, andInvestigate, 11 LITGATION 13, 15 (inter 1985);
see also Fleming Sales Co., Inc. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (lawyers have a
broad responsibility to probe the client about the facts).
72. See, eg., Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1012 (2nd Cir. 1986) (court




mitted."73 The drafters of Rule 11 foresaw that the reasonableness of an
inquiry into facts would depend on the individual case. Thus, factors which
a federal district court should consider in evaluating a reasonable inquiry
include: the complexity of the facts;74 whether the case was accepted from
another attorney;75 the lawyer's expertise in the field; 76 whether the attor-
ney had substantial access to research facilities;77 and whether the signer of
the documents had sufficient time for investigation. 78 Furthermore, an at-
torney should consider the reliability of the facts furnished by the client and
explore the source, since "unverified hearsay based on rumor"79 has been
sanctioned.
One example of failure to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts oc-
curred in Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun.Y° In Viola, the plaintiff alleged
a nationwide trade conspiracy based on the sale of a single pair of counter-
feit designer jeans for ten dollars."1 The court found that the plaintiff made
no investigation of the facts before filing its complaint and imposed sanc-
tions under Rule 11 on the plaintiff and its attorneys in the amount of
$20,000.2 Clearly, the attorneys failed their "stop-and-think obligation" 3
under Rule 11.
2. Reasonable Inquiry Into Law
In addition to the requirement of a reasonable inquiry into fact, plead-
ings and briefs must be "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." 4 Rule 11 is
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes. The court "is expected to avoid using the
wisdom of hindsight ...." Id.
74. See Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; R.K. Harp Inv. Corp. v. McQuade, 825 F.2d 1101, 1103-04
(7th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv. Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1987).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
76. Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 194.
77. Id. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (Schwarzer, J.) (noting counsel's access to Lexis), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435.
79. Miller v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
80. 574 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
81. Id. at 621. The plaintiff filed suit approximately eight days after the pair of jeans had
been purchased; that single sale was the basis for the alleged nationwide conspiracy. Id.
82. Id.
83. A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 15; accord Stewart v. RCA Corp., 790 F.2d 624, 633 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("Rule 11 requires attorneys to think first and file later"); In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441,
442 (7th Cir. 1985); Duncan v. WJLA-TV, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 4, 5-6 (D.D.C. 1984); see also Roths-
child, supra note 71, at 13.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831 (stating that "good faith belief in the
merit of a legal argument is an objective condition which a competent attorney attains only after
reasonable inquiry"); Weir v. Lehman Newspapers, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 574, 576 (D. Colo. 1985)
[Vol. 72:91
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
clearly not intended to discourage lawyers from proffering innovative argu-
ments. Nevertheless, there are limits. Counsel who place an unreasonable
burden of study and illumination on opposing counsel should expect to pay
the consequences - sanctions under Rule 11.11 An advocate must repre-
sent his or her client within the existing structure of the law, and not some
imagined version of it.86
Inadequate legal analysis on the part of an attorney is particularly fatal
under Rule 11. In fact, courts seem to possess a greater willingness to im-
pose sanctions for legally frivolous claims than for those claims evidencing
a failure of factual inquiry. 7
If a claim is highly implausible, then an attorney must refrain from filing
in order to avoid sanctions. For example, in Blair v. Shenandoah Women's
Center, Inc.,"8 the plaintiff sued a battered women's shelter which had pro-
vided plaintiff's wife protection from him. The plaintiff alleged sex discrim-
ination, conspiracy, defamation, and harassment, and sought ten million
dollars in damages.8 9 The court dismissed the case and awarded attorneys'
fees.9" Claims such as this one, which are devoid of any colorable legal
basis will be abrogated and sanctioned appropriately. However, the legal
basis of most claims is not easy to evaluate. 91
Almost every new claim presents a novel question of law which varies to
some extent from existing law. Thus, it is imperative that a reasonably
competent attorney analyze precedent, evaluate evidence, and understand
basic legal principles.92 A presumption has evolved in various federal cir-
cuits that if an attorney argues a legal theory purported to follow "existing
law" without citing directly adverse controlling authority, Rule 11 has been
violated.93
(holding that "[i]f there is no objective basis for an attorney's belief that his client's claims are
warranted by... law.., then sanctions should be imposed").
85. Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986).
86. Id.
87. S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 34 (Federal Judicial Center
1985).
88. 757 F.2d 1435 (4th Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 1435.
90. Id.
91. Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 630, 638 (1987).
92. See McLaughlin v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Ala. 1985) (counsel
sanctioned for ignoring a "hornbook" rule of law with intent to delay proceedings); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 comment (1983).
93. See, e.g., Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 625 F. Supp. 1543, 1547-48 (M.D. Fla. 1986)
(Rule 11 sanctions imposed because attorney ignored precedent and relied instead on an inapplica-
ble case to present a misleading standard to the court); Cameron v. Internal Revenue Serv., 593 F.
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However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Golden Eagle Distribut-
ing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,9 held that failure to cite adverse authority
was not a valid ground for Rule 11 sanctions.95 The district court in Golden
Eagle sanctioned the defendant's attorneys for completely ignoring directly
adverse authority in their motion for summary judgment.9 6 The court of
appeals maintained that if Rule 11 was expanded that far, "mandatory
sanctions would ride on close decisions concerning whether or not one case
is or is not the same as another."97 Though the court acknowledged that a
lawyer should be sanctioned under Rule 11 for exhibiting "real or feigned
ignorance of authorities which render his argument meritless,"98 it declined
to sanction attorneys who had done just that.
Sanctions are to be reserved for those theories that a reasonably compe-
tent attorney99 would deem frivolous."° An attorney either has to have a
reasonable belief that a paper is "warranted by existing law"' 01 or that a
good faith argument can be made "for the extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law."102 In order to determine if either of these legal argu-
Supp. 1540, 1557 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (Rule 11 sanctions imposed for litigating in the face of control-
ling precedents that removed any colorable basis in law for the claim).
94. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 1542. The court also concluded that Rule 11 does not require that counsel cor-
rectly differentiate between whether their position is warranted by existing law or is a good faith
argument for modification, extension, or reversal of existing law. It simply requires that the mo-
tion be either one or the other. Id. at 1539.
96. 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
97. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1542.
98. Id.
99. The "reasonable man" against which conduct is tested is a competent attorney admitted
to practice before the district court. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830.
100. The following cases are actual examples that have plagued the judicial system:
- a grocer's suit against a patron for eating a grape in his supermarket without paying for it;
- a patient's suit against his dentist for $85.63 in compensation after being forced to wait one
hour forty-seven minutes for his appointment;
- an attorney's suit against Jimmy the Groundhog for mistakenly forecasting an early spring;
- a fan's suit against the [Green Bay Packers] for misrepresentating itself as a professional
football team;
- a $10 million federal class action suit against professional baseball on behalf of all fans
allegedly injured by the 1982 baseball strike;
- a suitor's action against a young woman for the price of flowers and a theater ticket after
she cancelled her promise to date him;
- an inmate's nuisance suit on the grounds that a newly installed toilet seat was too cold;
- another inmate's nuisance suit that he had lost friends because his brand of deodorant was
no longer carried by the prison commissary.
W. FREEDMAN, FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS AND FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES 4 (1987) (quoting Hurley,
Much Ado About Nothing: An Epidemic of Frivolous Law Suits Is Turning Our Legal System into
the Courtroom of the Assured, 17 DOCKET CALL 14, 14-17 (Summer 1982)) (emphasis added).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
102. Id.
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ments is sufficiently plausible under amended Rule 11, an objective
standard analyzing the facts and circumstances of the case is utilized.1"3
This standard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula, and
thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger a Rule
11 violation.1" Moreover, the drafters of Rule 11 deleted willfulness as a
prerequisite to disciplinary action. This omission was intended to reduce
the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions. 105
Under this legal inquiry strand of Rule 11, a good faith argument advo-
cating a change in the law is not found simply in the absence of subjective
bad faith. 106 Rather, good faith is objectively established by performing a
reasonable inquiry into the law and revealing a logical basis to believe that
103. See Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1987);
Robinson v. National Cash Register, Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1127 (5th Cir. 1987); Dreis & Krump
Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986); Brown v. National
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 171 (7th Cir. 1986); Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830-31.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes; see also Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d
339 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. The 1983 amendment deleted the term "willful" from the original version of Rule 11,
thereby doing away with the original rule's subjective bad faith standard. Eastway Constr. Corp.
v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (original Rule clearly required subjective
bad faith, and the amended Rule 11 does not); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
"The reference in the former text to willfulness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action has been
deleted." Id. See Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Kroger Co., 619 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(standard for imposing sanctions under original Rule 11 was whether the action was taken in good
faith).
In the first major decision evaluating the amended Rule, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit interpreted the rejection of the willfulness standard of old Rule 11 by
saying, "Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did." Eastway
Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 253; see also Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 350. ("[Original] Rule 11 speaks in
plainly subjective terms"); accord Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986)
(amended Rule 11 is designed to discourage groundless filings, even if not filed in subjective bad
faith); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (proper test under
original Rule 11 is whether conduct was taken in subjective bad faith); Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge-
Lee Indus.,Inc., 585 F. Supp. 69, 71 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (original Rule 11 required an attorney to act
in subjective good faith regardless of the objective merit of the filing); see also Pudlo v. Director,
Internal Revenue Serv., 587 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (N.D. II. 1984).
The term "willful" is defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (5th ed. 1979) as
"[p]roceeding from a conscious motive of the will; voluntary. Intending the result which actually
comes to pass; designed; intentional; not accidental or involuntary .... Premeditated; malicious;
done with evil intent, or with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the natural conse-
quences; unlawful, without legal justification." Id. See generally Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees
for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613 (1983) (due to infrequent use, most sanc-
tion powers are ineffective deterrents).
106. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831. "A good faith belief in the merit of a legal argument is an
objective condition which a competent attorney attains only after reasonable inquiry." Id. But
cf. Note, supra note 25, at 766-67. "In both the wording of Rule 11 and in the Advisory Commit-
tee Note, [an] ambiguous term such as "good faith argument"... impl[ies] a subjective standard."
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existing precedent should be changed. 11 7 Attorneys should not be penalized
for waging uphill battles,10 8 but good faith does insist that there be some
realistic possibility that the claim will succeed.' 0 9
C. Improper Purpose Clause
As the preceding discussion shows, the first prong of Rule 11, the frivo-
lousness clause, is directed at the merits of frivolous papers. The second
prong, the improper purpose clause, is aimed at papers which, though not
necessarily frivolous, ° are found to be interposed for any improper pur-
pose. This aspect of Rule 11 attempts to address the problem of misusing
judicial procedures as a weapon for personal or economic harassment. 1
The improper purpose clause is not limited to papers filed in bad faith. In
fact, the text of the amended rule itself does not refer to bad faith. 2
Rather, the rule conditions the imposition of sanctions on a finding of "any
improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or need-
less increase in the cost of litigation." ' Whereas the original Rule listed
only "delay" as an improper purpose,1 14 the new rule recognizes other im-
proper purposes. Rule 11 now explicitly refers to harassment and unneces-
sary increase in litigation costs in addition to delay, and further implies
that courts may find still other improper purposes.1 15
107. See Blake v. National Cas. Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 192 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (Rule 11 permits
attorneys to challenge precedent and advance novel theories of law, but at some point, such legal
arguments become frivolous).
108. Fleming Sales, 611 F. Supp. at 519.
109. See id.
110. "Frivolous is of the same order of magnitude as less than a scintilla." Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
601 (5th ed. 1979), defines frivolous as "[o]f little weight or importance. A pleading is 'frivolous'
when it is clearly insufficient on its face ... and is presumably interposed for mere purposes of
delay or to embarrass the opponent." Id.
111. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830; see also WSB Elec. Co. v. Rank & File, 103 F.R.D. 417, 421
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding the plaintiff's claims groundless in fact and legally unwarranted and
concluding that the employer's purpose of advancing economic or political objectives through the
courts was improper); Lepucki, 587 F. Supp. at 1395 (imposing sanctions and concluding that "it
is patently obvious that this action was instituted not for the good faith reparation of an actual
wrong but, rather, as a device for asserting certain philosophical beliefs").
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes. "The reference ... to willfulness as a
prerequisite to disciplinary action has been deleted." Id.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
114. For text of original Rule 11, see supra note 24.
115. For text of amended Rule 11, see supra note 1.
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A preliminary draft of amended Rule 11 required that a pleading not be
"primarily interposed" for an improper purpose. 116 The drafter explained
that the word "primarily" was ultimately removed in the final version to
eliminate any ambiguity in the Rule.' 7 However, in the opinion of some
commentators, the drafters' inclusion in the improper purpose clause of
terms such as "unnecessary delay and needless cost" is inherently ambigu-
ous in and of itself,"8 and the standards by which improper purpose is to be
judged are confusing." 9 While the majority of the circuits have reasoned
that an improper purpose is to be tested by objective standards, 20 some
courts have interpreted the improper purpose language as synonymous with
bad faith. 12'
D. Mandatory Sanctions
The original Rule 11 -permitted a court to impose sanctions for infrac-
tions, whereas Rule 11, as amended, requires a court to impose sanc-
tions.1 22 Thus, once a violation of any of the certification requirements is
found, Rule 11 makes sanctions mandatory. The court does not have dis-
cretion, as it does under other rules and statutes, 23 to conclude that sanc-
tions are unwarranted and to deny them.
The mandatory language is designed to reduce the courts' historical re-
luctance to levy sanctions. Although nearly every major lawsuit now in-
cludes at least the threat of a Rule 11 motion, 21 sanctions are being
imposed mostly in civil rights, employment discrimination and public inter-
116. See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
app. C (March 9, 1982) (comments of Chairman Mansfield), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 190, 191
(1983).
117. Id.
118. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831 n.9; Note, supra note 25, at 762; Note, supra note 29, at
142.
119. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831-32.
120. The view is nearly unanimous that an improper purpose is to be tested by objective
standards. Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 253. Accord Brown, 830 F.2d at 1436; Thomas, 812
F.2d at 988; Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831.
121. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 105 F.R.D. at 626 (improper motive in form of delay constituted
bad faith); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 602 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 n.6 (D.D.C. 1985) (improper purpose
of harassment in instituting lawsuit and filing frivolous motions constitutes bad faith), aff'd, 803
F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also Joseph, The Trouble With Rule 11 - Uncertain Standards
and Mandatory Sanctions, 73 A.B.A. J. 87, 88 (Aug. 1, 1987).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court... shall impose... an appropriate sanction .. " (emphasis added)).
123. Under Rule 37 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a district court has discretion to award fees. See
supra note 16.
124. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at D8, col. 3.
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est cases. 125 It has become apparent that since the inception of amended
Rule 11, there has been a dramatic shift in judicial attitude toward the use
of sanctions. 126 There is little doubt that for the most part the federal judici-
ary is now firmly resolved to use Rule 11 to discourage the issuance of
frivolous claims.
1. Judicial Flexibility
Rule 11 makes sanctions mandatory, but it is within the court's discre-
tion to select an appropriate sanction tailored to the particular facts of the
case. 127 Though Rule 11 explicitly provides for an award of reasonable
costs and attorneys' fees to be imposed on the transgressing party, some
courts have gone beyond the express provision of Rule 11 and devised
unique alternatives. For example, in Heuttig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape
Contractors Council,1 28 an employer brought a frivolous labor law claim
against a local union. 2 9 Judge William W. Schwarzer, an avid proponent
of Rule 11, based his decision to impose sanctions on the facts that the
attorneys representing the employer held themselves out as experts in labor
law and had brought the action for an improper purpose.1 30  Besides order-
ing employer's counsel to pay sanctions of $5,625 to the union, Judge
Schwarzer demanded that the attorneys certify that no part of the sanctions
would be charged to or paid by the employer. The judge further excoriated
125. See S. KASSIN, supra note 87, at 38 (judges who frequently imposed sanctions tended to
impose them in a greater proportion of civil rights cases than did judges who used Rule 11 less
vigorously); see also Rampacek, The Impact of Rule 11 on Civil Rights Litigation, 3 LAB. LAW.
93, 96 & n.17 (1987).
"So far, defense lawyers have sought Rule 11 sanctions by a 3-1 margin over plaintiffs' law-
yers, according to Georgene Vairo, professor at Fordham University School of Law. Her research
also indicates that the motions have been brought in a disproportionate number of civil rights
cases." Marcotte, supra note 10, at 34.
126. See Rampacek, supra note 125, at 96-97.
127. "The court ... retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of
the rule. It has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it
should be well acquainted." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
128. 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 1522.
130. Judge Schwarzer commented on the employer's attorneys' conduct and experience:
Counsel in this case are not newly admitted to the bar or engaged as general practitioners
not well versed in labor law. The complaint is signed by a partner of the San Francisco
firm of Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy admitted to the bar for twelve years, and an
associate of that firm seven years at the bar.... The Littler, Mendelson firm holds itself out
as preeminent in labor law. Lawyers of that firm appear regularly and frequently in labor
litigation in this Court. Given the claimed expertise and experience of these attorneys, a
strong inference arises that their bringing of an action such as this was for an improper
purpose.
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the attorneys by ordering that a copy of his memorandum opinion be circu-
lated to each partner and associate in the firm.131 In another case, Judge
Schwarzer fashioned yet another type of sanction when he required an at-
torney to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice in
front of the court for violation of Rule 11.132 Furthermore, some courts
have even reasoned that in a particularly acute case of abuse, Rule 11 could
be used by a court to compensate itself for time unnecessarily consumed by
totally frivolous litigation.'33
2. Who May Be Sanctioned?
Rule 11 grants courts additional flexibility by providing that sanctions
may be imposed on the attorney, the client or both. However, the advisory
committee notes seem to encourage the courts to be cognizant of the pro se
litigant's lack of legal experience in determining the specific sanction.1
3 4
Consequently, courts have not imposed Rule 11 sanctions on pro se litigants
absent a blatant case of harassing and vexatious litigation,135 or "a complete
disregard for the sanctity of judicial processes."' 136
When imposing sanctions, the court must take into consideration the
nature of the violation and the relative responsibility of the parties involved.
If the Rule 11 infraction consists of a motion or other paper which is not
supported by existing law, the sanction should be assessed against the attor-
ney alone.' 3 7 An attorney and the client, however, can be held jointly and
131. See id. at 1522-23; see also Bockman v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 296, 299 (E.D.
Cal. 1985) (ordering copies of opinion given to every member of the sanctioned attorney's law
firm).
132. See Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
133. See, eg., Storage Tech. Partners v. Storage Tech. Corp., 117 F.R.D. 675, 679 (D. Colo.
1987) ("nowhere stated in the text [of Rule 11] that an opposing partyment must be the recipient
of the sanction imposed"); Hearld v. Barnes & Spectrum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D. 17, 19-20
(E.D. Tex. 1985) (imposing $5,000 fine payable to the court); Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154,
158 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (imposing $200 fine payable into court's registry).
134. "Although the standard is the same for unrepresented parties, who are obliged them-
selves to sign the pleadings, the court has sufficient discretion to take account of the special cir-
cumstances that often arise in pro se situations." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
See, e.g., Cavallary v. Lakewood Sky Diving Center, 623 F. Supp. 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(court would not sanction pro se plaintiff who lacked training to perceive legal inadequacies, but
plaintiff here had been told by the previous court that his case was groundless); Blume v. Leake,
618 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D. Idaho 1985) (pro se litigant given benefit of the doubt); Heimbaugh v. City
of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (court noted that pro se litigant had
limited legal experience and limited sanction to $50). But see Bacon v. AFSCME Council 13, 795
F.2d 33, 34-35 (7th Cir. 1986); Tarkowski v. County of Lake, 775 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1985).
135. Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226, 227 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal
dismissed mem., 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984).
136. Note, supra note 12, at 353.
137. See Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 193; Wold, 575 F. Supp. at 167-68.
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severally liable if the Rule 11 violation reflects a "deliberate litigation strat-
egy."' 38 This joint and several liability assures that the party burdened by
the filing is reimbursed for its costs. 139
3. Procedural Aspects
Under Rule 11, the court may impose sanctions either on its own initia-
tive' 40 or upon the motion of the aggrieved party, by authorizing a sua
sponte imposition of sanctions. Amended Rule 11 makes clear that so long
as a violation is apparent to the court, sanctions are mandatory even in the
absence of a motion by the opposing party. This concept of judicial en-
forcement is to be applied with vigor, yet exercised with caution.
Caution should also be exercised when a motion by a party is involved.
Courts must be wary not to encourage attorneys to move for sanctions
every time a motion is denied, a pleading is struck, or summary judgment is
granted. 14 ' A motion for sanctions under Rule 11 should not be made casu-
ally, as it could reflect on an attorney's record or perhaps injure his profes-
sional reputation, 42 regardless of the motion outcome. Accordingly, courts
should reserve sanctions only for clearly frivolous claims 143 or conduct
which is so blatant and egregious that it merits such an assessment.
"A party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the of-
fending party promptly upon discovering the basis for doing so."'" Fol-
lowing that, a party seeking sanctions must make the requisite reasonable
inquiry that the rule requires for all motions because Rule 11 motions,
themselves, are subject to possible sanctions.' 45
Although Rule 11 does not address the issue of procedural rights of
attorneys and clients who are being sanctioned, the advisory committee
138. See Kendrick, 609 F. Supp. at 1173 (both attorney and client liable for filing frivolous
claims).
139. The potential for clients to be sanctioned may create conffict within the attorney-client
relationship. See Eastway Constr. Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 570. "[T]he effect on attorney-client
privilege and trust, may be devastating." Id. "A similar problem may arise between out-of-town
and local counsel." Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 199.
140. "Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on their own motion."
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
141. See Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
142. See Rothschild, supra note 71, at 15.
143. See, eg., Bradlee, 803 F.2d at 1197 (plaintiff was sanctioned more than $12,900 for his
seven-year escapade in both state and federal courts); Thiel v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 646
F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (plaintiffs refused to abandon action after being warned by the
court).
144. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
145. See Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (ancillary
proceedings are subject to Rule 11).
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notes contain conflicting statements about procedural rights of due pro-
cess. 146 While the committee notes comment that "[t]he procedure obvi-
ously must comport with due process requirements,"147 they also suggest
that "procedural safeguards should be kept to a minimum."148 Courts
have thus held that notice and an opportunity to be heard on the record, in
addition to the filing of the motion, are sufficient to comport with due pro-
cess requirements. 149 In the usual case, sanction proceedings are limited to
the record;5 0 discovery or a full-blown evidentiary hearing are allowed
only under extraordinary circumstances.1 51 Any expanded procedural ap-
proach would defeat the goals of Rule 11 to promote judicial economy and
deter the filing of future frivolous actions.1 52
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH
A. Confusion at the Outset
Presently, all the federal circuit courts of appeals maintain that the ap-
propriate standard for the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 is an ob-
jective one. 153  However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
147. Id.
148. Eastway Constr. Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 568.
149. See, eg., Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 609 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (N.D. I11. 1985)
(allowing plaintiff to respond to Rule 11 request is sufficient opportunity to be heard), aff'd, 784
F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13, 27-28 (N.D. Ill.
1984) ("[ilt would be of no value to hold a hearing at which plaintiff's attorneys could explain to
me why they felt it necessary to festoon their complaint with frivolous claims"), aff'd, 771 F.2d
194 (7th Cir. 1985); Dore, 582 F. Supp. at 158 (sanctions imposed sua sponte without hearing); cf.
Kendrick, 609 F. Supp. at 1162. In Kendrick, the court ordered a hearing prior to awarding fees.
However, the hearing appeared to have been scheduled primarily for purposes of allowing the
responding attorneys to show cause why they should not be suspended from practicing in the
California federal courts, not for purposes of considering the opposing counsel's fee application.
Id. at 1173. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (due process requires, at a mini-
mum, a notice and an opportunity to be heard, "appropriate to the nature of the case").
150. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 198; see also Thomas, 812 F.2d at 989.
151. Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation By Demanding Profes-
sional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 300, 328 (1986).
152. See Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court on remand
was urged to consider that the costs of sanction litigation could exceed the efficiencies sought by
the federal rules, and that the scope of its sanction proceedings should therefore be limited. Id. at
1179.
153. See Stites v. Internal Revenue Serv., 793 F.2d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 1986) ("in addition to a
subjective, good faith belief that the pleading is well founded in both fact and law Fed. R. Civ. P.
11 now requires that the belief be objectively reasonable"); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.
of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986) ("a court must judge the attorney's conduct under an
objective standard of reasonableness rather than by assessing subjective intent"); Lieb v. Topstone
Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); Zalvidar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d
823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986) (subjective bad faith is not an element to be proved under present Rule
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Seventh Circuit initially failed to clearly adopt the objective standard and,
as a result, caused confusion for its district courts.
The confusion was created by the decision in Suslick v. Rothschild Se-
curities Corp.,"' in which the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court's
order granting Rule 11 attorneys' fees to the defendant.'55 The court of
appeals' basis for its decision included factors that the plaintiff's complaint
involved a complex area of the law, the claim was at least colorable, and the
attorney's action did not exhibit (subjective) bad faith.' 56 At first glance,
application of the subjective bad faith standard in Suslick seemed funda-
mentally fair and accurate because although the case was decided after Au-
gust 1, 1983,' the court considered conduct occurring before the
amendment to Rule 11. However, confusion was created when the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals quoted amended Rule 11 in its entirety and then
stated that amended Rule 11 "requires a finding of subjective bad faith
.... "158 Though perhaps mistaken dictum, the Suslick decision nonethe-
less obfuscated the issue in the courts of the Seventh Circuit.
For example, in Davis v. United States,159 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied defendant's motion for
attorneys' fees because the defendant had failed to show that the plaintiff
acted in subjective bad faith.16 In concluding that subjective bad faith was
still the test, the court noted that such a standard appeared inconsistent
with the purpose of the 1983 amendments, but then stated "it is clear that
Suslick itself was interpreting the amended version of Rule 11 ... and this
court is bound by that interpretation." 16' The same district court, in Ba-
11); Confederacion Laborista de Puerto Rico v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 778 F.2d 65, 66 (1st Cir.
1985) (same); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985)
("subjective bad faith is no longer a predicate to a Rule 11 violation; the test is now an objective
one of reasonableness"); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir.
1985); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Moore v. City of Des
Moines, 766 F.2d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d
243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985); Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
154. 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984).
155. Id. at 1006-07. The court relied on Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and asserted that both
required a showing of bad faith. Id. See supra note 16 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
156. Suslick, 741 F.2d at 1006.
157. See supra text accompanying note 53.
158. Suslick, 741 F.2d at 1007 (emphasis added).
159. 104 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
160. Id. at 512; see also ABA, LITIGATION SECTION, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER
POWERS 73 (C. Schaffer, Jr. ed. 1986) (the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
applied the "subjective bad faith" test in a series of tax appeals).
161. Davis, 104 F.R.D. at 512 n.2.
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ranski v. Serhant,162 again expressed doubt as to Suslick, commenting that
the "holding [was] open to question." 163
Finally, in the case of In re Ronco, Inc., 6 the same district court as-
sumed the ultimate responsibility and cleared the "somewhat muddied
water" of the Seventh Circuit, holding that the objective standard applies to
Rule 11 motions. 165 Analyzing amended Rule 11 and the advisory commit-
tee notes, the court determined "it is exceedingly plain a new objective test
of reasonableness has taken the place of Rule 1 's former subjective test of
good faith."166 The district court asserted that the Suslick court had mis-
takenly cited to the amended Rule and concluded therefore that the Suslick
test was not binding. 67 Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
straightened out its own tortuous path in subsequent decisions,1 68 but with
no mention of the Ronco analysis.1 69
B. A Chilling Approach to Rule 11
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirm-
atively adopted the objective test for Rule 11 determinations, it put forth a
series of opinions which exhibited an arbitrary and capricious manner of
application. As a result, Rule .11 has been transformed from a protector
against frivolous litigation, designed to be utilized in only the most egre-
162. 106 F.R.D. 247, 250 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
163. Id.
164. 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985), vacated, 838 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988).
165. Id. at 497.
166. Id. at 495. Judge Schwarzer has rejected any kind of bad faith formulation:
To test compliance with the rule, as some courts have done, by reference to whether bad
faith has been shown is inconsistent with its text and purpose. The Advisory Committee
Notes point out that 'the standard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula
and thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation;'
willfulness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action was deleted by the 1983 amendment
which 'is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions... by emphasiz-
ing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition
of sanctions.' Reasonable belief that a paper is 'warranted by law' should therefore be
treated as an objective standard turning on the facts and circumstances of the case, not on
the attorney's state of mind.
Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 191 (citations omitted).
167. Ronco, 105 F.R.D. at 497.
168. See Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986); Indianapolis Colts v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985); Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 265 n.4
(7th Cir. 1985); see also Pawlowske v. Chrysler Corp., 623 F. Supp. 569, 572 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(objective standard followed); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1566 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (same); Sloan v. United States, 621 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (same).
169. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, 775 F.2d at 181 (prior to the amendment, Rule 11 was
incorporated as requiring a showing of subjective bad faith, however, the amended standard is one
of reasonableness); Frazier, 771 F.2d at 263 (the standard is an objective one).
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gious of circumstances, into an instigator of ancillary proceedings. This
change, resulting from a new judicial attitude, does not bode well for liti-
gators in the Seventh Circuit. Recent decisions reflect the whimsical man-
ner in which sanctions under Rule 11 have been imposed.
In fact, a careful analysis of several Seventh Circuit opinions prompts
legitimate concern for creative advocates, especially because mandatory
sanctions now hinge upon dubious judicial decisions in borderline cases.
Rule 11, as amended, was intended to achieve a modest step toward easing
the congestion in the federal courts. It was not meant to require an attor-
ney to forego recovery on a particular theory merely because he or she be-
lieves there is a strong chance of losing. 170 Nor was its purpose to force an
attorney to balance his or her obligation of zealous advocacy to a client
against the possibility of the imposition of sanctions. Moreover, it was not
the drafters' desire to replace the atmosphere of friendly cooperation and
professional collegiality existing between opposing attorneys in civil litiga-
tion with increased hostility in an already adversary atmosphere. 7' Yet it
is clear that by its arbitrary application of Rule 11, the Seventh Circuit has
judicially expanded the Rule far beyond the original vision of the drafters.
As a result, vigorous advocacy, a concept deeply embodied in the American
legal system, is unnecessarily chilled.
1. Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.: Reasonable Lawyers Could
Differ
In Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.,172 the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal of a civil rights suit and the award of Rule 11 sanctions
against plaintiff's attorneys for filing what the district court described as a
"ponderous, extravagant, and overblown complaint."' 7 3 The plaintiff sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after police threatened him with a warrant for his
arrest unless he appeared at the police station. They subsequently de-
tained him overnight for ten and a half hours on a groundless charge with-
out allowing him to post bail or call an attorney. 174 The plaintiff eventually
stood trial and was found not guilty. 175
170. See Weinstein v. University of Ill., 630 F. Supp. 635, 636 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 811
F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
171. See Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ooh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
172. 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
173. Id. at 22. In his amended complaint, Rodgers alleged that the police, and a towing
company had conspired to bring a false vandalism charge against him for throwing paint on a
building, and that the city of Chicago maintained unconstitutional policies. Id. at 16-17.




Plaintiff's complaint charged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, but the court dismissed the complaint and assessed sanctions under
Rule 11 for legally unwarranted pleadings.176 The court disagreed with the
plaintiff's attorneys that several cases under section 1983177 support his
claim and found other case law controlling. It seems that plaintiff's attor-
neys were penalized, in part, because their view of the law opposed the line
of reasoning employed by the court.
For example, the court found implausible the plaintiff's claim that the
threat of arrest made the police officer's order to appear at the station an
unconstitutional fourth amendment seizure. 17 8 However, United States v.
Mendenhall,17 9 the case cited by the court as support, held that using "a
show of authority" to inhibit a person's movement may amount to a fourth
amendment violation.1 80 Even though the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
described the threats of police and extended detention as more than a "rela-
tively minor incident," 8 ' the court, in affirming, failed (as did the district
court) to "reasonably inquire" into the law. Thus, in a situation where
competent attorneys and judges had different, but plausible views of the
law, sanctions were imposed.
2. In re Kelly: A Questionable Call
In the decision of In re Kelly,1 82 an attorney was ordered by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals to show cause why he should not be disciplined
for violating Rule 11.183 He was charged with a failure to make a reason-
able factual inquiry before drafting a single statement in an affidavit filed in
support of an accompanying motion. 84 Use of Rule 11 sanctions to penal-
ize one questionable statement in an affidavit raises two obvious, interre-
lated concerns: first, whether this type of conduct was contemplated by the
drafters of amended Rule 11 to be within the purview of Rule 11 sanctions;
176. Id. at 17-22. The total sanction was $858.43. Id. at 28.
177. Attorneys for Rodgers cited two cases: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
(1982), and United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068
(1983) "which indicate that some of his claims could well have been found actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983." Snyder, supra note 12, at 17.
178. Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at 18-19.
179. 446 U.S. 544 (1980); see also Note, supra note 91, at 639.
180. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55.
181. Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205-06 n.8. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also noted that
the imposed sanction of $858.43 (one-third of the attorney fees) indicated the possible merit of
some of Rodger's claims. Id. at 205. For a discussion of the issue that arises from this indication,
see infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text.
182. 808 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1986).
183. Id. at 549.
184. Id. at 550.
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and second, whether Rule 11 should apply to individual arguments in a
paper filed with the court or should it apply only to the filing as a whole.
The Seventh Circuit classified counsel's statement as a "shot in the dark,
a guess,"' 85 and then proceeded to conclude that the statement expressed a
positive fact.'I 6 Nowhere in the text of Rule 11 or the advisory committee
notes is the rhetoric "positive fact" mentioned or envisioned. Irrespective
of that fact, the court put forth an arbitrary, subjective concept of which
litigators must now be wary. As a result of this creation, the court seems to
place an excessive burden on attorneys practicing in the Seventh Circuit to
initially decide whether an allegation of fact is an acceptable positive fact or
an "extravagant inference"'18 7 in the eyes of the court. This stringent re-
quirement serves only to broaden the scope of Rule 11 to envelop conduct
not intended to be violative of Rule 11..
In addition, In re Kelly broaches another topic which has yet to be ex-
plicitly addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, but was
considered by a Seventh Circuit district court in Martinez, Inc. v. H. Lan-
dau & Co.. I" In Martinez, the court held that Rule 11 was not intended to
apply to particular arguments within the pleading, but rather applied to the
motion as a whole."i 9 Otherwise, the opinion cautioned, the Rule would
"spawn litigation as potentially abusive as that which Rule 11 was designed
to prevent."'9 ° The court further noted that under the contrary view of
focusing on individual arguments, attorneys would be less apt to raise po-
tentially meritorious issues, and worse yet, sanctions could be awarded
against the party that prevailed. Despite the fact that this issue was visibly
present in Kelly, the court omitted any such discussion.
185. Id. at 551.
186. The court stated:
A statement of positive fact is a representation not only that the fact is true as represented,
but also that the person making the statement has a solid basis for making it. If someone
asks you the time, you look at your watch (which you know doesn't work) and tell him it is
2:05, you are misleading him even if 2:05 is your best guess of what time it is. Even if the
facts alleged in Mr. Kelly's affidavit are true, which they now appear not to be, the affidavit
is an attestation that they are based on knowledge rather than reckless surmize - one does
not swear to 'facts' that one has no reasonable grounds for believing to be true.
Id.
187. Id. at 552.
188. 107 F.R.D. 775 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
189. Id. at 777. In Martinez, Landau filed a counterclaim alleging RICO violations by Marti-
nez. Martinez, in response, filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on four grounds. Two of
the grounds were arguably frivolous while the remaining two arguments were subsequently re-
jected by contrary Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 776-77.
190. Id. at 779.
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Although another district court in the Seventh Circuit refrained from
deciding whether to subscribe to Martinez, 91 courts in other jurisdictions
have specifically dealt with the concern.192 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. 193 stated that
"the fact that the court concludes that one argument or subargument in
support of an otherWise valid motion, pleading, or other paper is unmer-
itorious does not warrant a finding that the motion or pleading is frivolous
or that the rule has been violated." 194 An operation of Rule 11 which fo-
cuses on individual statements, as is the case in Kelly, chills an advocate's
freedom to be enthusiastic and creative.
3. Lawyers in the Seventh Circuit, Take Heed!195
The caustic approach to sanctions under Rule 11 by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals continues to have a profound chilling impact on litigators
in that circuit. The theory that a judge who awards sanctions is "often
advocating the correctness of his decision and is likely to do so by shaping
the presentation of facts convincingly,"' 196 gains more credence each time a
decision is handed down by the Seventh Circuit. This is due, in large part,
to the excessively punitive rationale which seems to underlie some of the
recent decisions by that court.
For example, in Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,197 the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff's due process claim
was "wacky," reversed the district court's denial of a motion for sanctions,
and remanded the case for the imposition of sanctions.198 In its majority
opinion, the court of appeals rebuked the district court because sanctions
were denied without an explanation. The criticism of the district court's
191. See Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 623 F. Supp. 927, 933 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 1985). "This
Court need not now decide whether to subscribe to the recent dictum in Martinez... for the
situation there was critically different from this one." Id.
192. See Storage Tech. Partners v. Storage Tech. Corp., 117 F.R.D. 675, 681 (D. Colo. 1987).
This court does not agree with Martinez that Rule 11 only addresses itself to pleadings in their
entirety. The court asserts as its basis Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
posits in regard to pleadings that "[a]ll statements shall be made subject to the obligations set
forth in Rule 11." Id.
Even under Storage Tech., the analysis concerning In re Kelly is not affected because Kelly
involved an affidavit and Rule 8(e)(2) only applies to pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a) and 8(a).
See also In re Sheret, 76 Bankr. 935, 937 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting Martinez as controlling).
193. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
194. Id. at 1541.
195. See Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247, 256
(7th Cir. 1986).
t96. Nelken, supra note 12, at 1339-40.
197. 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
198. Id. at 1075, 1080.
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failure to explain its denial of sanctions was unwarranted, since an explana-
tion is necessary only in instances when sanctions were actually imposed.
Any other approach will increase a district court's burden by creating more
work and will generate the potential for collateral litigation. Thus, in effect,
the court of appeals totally disregarded Rule 1 l's admonition against ancil-
lary proceedings.
The majority in Szabo also did not agree with the plaintiff's selection of
cases cited in support of their due process argument, even though one of
these cases explicitly approved the plaintiffs approach to due process. 199 It
seems that the Seventh Circuit is imposing an affirmative duty to identify
contrary authority in preparation of a claim, a concept which has been de-
nounced by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals."° Perhaps a more thor-
ough inquiry into the law on the part of the majority would have revealed
that the plaintiffs claim possibly had merit. The court failed to notice that
"[d]ue process, unfortunately, is an area where creativity and frivolity
sometimes threaten to merge,"20 1 and in the words of the dissent, this "de-
cision will reach as tellingly to the most meritorious [due process] claims as
to the least."2" 2
In the words of Judge Parsons, dissenting in Hill v. Norfolk and Western
Railway Co. :203
The unmonitored act of assessing sanctions against a lawyer can too
easily beget emotion. It is a common human tendency to find self
assurance in anger when punishing, and that drive for self assurance
itself tends to enhance the level of the punishment. In the perform-
ance of the judicial function, a court like any other person in author-
ity too easily can lose sight of its otherwise dispassionate review of
the facts and the law when it considers without a prior exchange of
reasoning an assessment of sanctions.2°
V. CONCLUSION
Rule 11 was designed to curb, not destroy, the advocate's zeal. At the
outset of amended Rule 11, there was concern that this punitive provision
199. See id. at 1085 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). "Three Rivers Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1980) has been explicitly approved by Northwest Disposal Co.
v. Village of Fox Lake, 119 Ill. App. 3d 546, 551, 456 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1983)." Id.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
201. Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1085 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1086.
203. 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987).
204. Id. at 1203 (Parsons, J., dissenting).
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might become "a new toy for lawyers."20 The question in the Seventh
Circuit, however, has become when will the judges of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals put their new toy down. The new reasonable standard of
Rule 11 has allowed, and may continue to enable, the Seventh Circuit to
arbitrarily reprimand attorneys, resulting in the ruining of professional
reputations.
Certainly, intentional abuse of the adversarial process should be sanc-
tioned. However, the current approach to sanctions needs to be reconsid-
ered in light of the original intent of Rule 11 to minimize frivolous claims,
not creative litigation. Any other alternative will lead to a litigious
nightmare culminating in the vindicated party leaping up and exclaiming,
"I hereby move to sanction the sanction motion." 20 6
MICHAEL J. MAZURCZAK*
205. Address by Arthur R. Miller, Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit
of the United States (Sept. 30, 1983), reprinted in 101 F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984).
206. Id.; see also Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir.
1986). Professor Miller's nightmare occurred in this case in which the plaintiff responded to the
defendant's Rule motion by moving to sanction the sanction motion. The district court granted
the defendant's motion for sanctions, denied the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, and awarded
defendant costs incurred in responding to the plaintiff's sanction motion. Id. at 1059. The court
of appeals found that the district court abused its discretion in granting the defendant's motion,
but affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Id. at 1060-61. The appellate court
did not deal explicitly with the award of costs to the defendant.
* The author expresses his gratitude to Professor Christine M. Wiseman for her helpful com-
ments on this article.
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